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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Bad Boys Bail Bonds, Inc's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and ordering Bad Boys to pay the $10,000? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has 
shown rule 60(b) grounds, and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when 
there has been an abuse of discretion." Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ^ f 19, 
183 P.3d 1052 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ^  9, 2 P.3d 451). Specifically, in "the context of a denial of a 
rule 60(b) motion, [the Court] review[s] a district court's findings of fact under a clear 
error standard of review . . . while [the Court] reviewfs] a district court's conclusions of 
law for correctness, affording the trail court no deference." Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Appellee in this case is Dixon Building, L.L.C. ("Dixon"). The Appellant in 
this case, Bad Boys Bail Bonds, Inc. ("Bad Boys"), is appealing an order and judgment of 
the district court, which found that Bad Boys had to pay Dixon $10,000. 
The dispute in this case arose from an unlawful detainer proceeding initiated by 
Dixon against its former commercial tenants, Adrian Jefferson and Rosae L. Jefferson 
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(the "Jeffersons") for nonpayment of rent. At the immediate occupancy hearing in the 
unlawful detainer matter, the district court ordered the Jeffersons to pay the amounts 
owing under the lease, post a $10,000 cash or property bond with the court, or vacate the 
premises within seventy-two hours. The Jeffersons paid Bad Boys to post a bond, which 
Bad Boys posted, thereby allowing the Jeffersons to remain in possession of the premises 
until an evidentiary hearing on the eviction could be held. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court entered judgment for Dixon, ordering 
the Jeffersons to vacate the premises and pay Dixon a total judgment of $19,343.53. The 
district court likewise ordered that the posted bond be forfeited to Dixon. Bad Boys 
moved the district court to set aside its order that the bond be forfeited, but the district 
court denied Bad Boys' motion to set aside. Thereafter, Bad Boys moved the court to 
reconsider its decision denying Bad Boys' motion to set aside the order forfeiting the 
bond, but the district court again ruled against Bad Boys and found in favor of Dixon. 
This appeal arises from that ruling. 
II. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE 
COURT BELOW. 
On May 9, 2008, Dixon commenced the proceeding below by filing a Complaint 
in the district court, seeking to evict the Jeffersons and recover damages based on the 
Jeffersons' unlawful detainer. [R. at 1-38.] 
On June 9, 2008, the district court ordered the Jeffersons to post a $10,000 cash or 
property bond or vacate the premises within seventy-two hours, and signed an order to 
this end on June 11, 2008. [R. at 81, 88-89.] 
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On June 11, 2008, Bad Boys posted a $105000 bond on the Jeffersons' behalf. [R. 
at 82-83.] 
On June 30, 2008, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered the 
Jeffersons to vacate the premises by July 6, 2008 and pay damages totaling $19,343.53 to 
Dixon. [R. at 181.] The district court likewise ordered the $10,000 bond be forfeited to 
Dixon on this date, and signed an order to this end on July 7, 2008. [Id, R. at 190-191.] 
On July 25, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, For Joinder, 
and Exoneration of Bond ("Motion to Set Aside Judgment") related to the district court's 
July 7th Order. [R. at 198-212.] 
On August 11, 2008, Dixon filed an objection to Bad Boys' Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment. [R. at 215-229.] 
On August 25, 2008, the district court issued its Minute Entry and Order on Bad 
Boys' Motion to Set Aside Judgment, finding in favor of Dixon. [R. at 230-232.] 
On September 15, 2008, Dixon filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Against 
Bad Boys. [R. at 241-243.] 
On October 8, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Motion to Reconsider its Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment ("Motion to Reconsider"), and a response to Dixon's Motion for Order 
to Show Cause. [R. at 247-259.] 
On November 19, 2008, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Bad 
Boys' Motion to Reconsider and Dixon's Order to Show Cause, at the conclusion of the 
hearing the district court took the matter under advisement. [R. at 274, 306.] 
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On November 24, 2008, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order, finding in favor of Dixon. [R. at 275-277.] On December 24, 2008, the district 
court signed a final Judgment, ordering Bad Boys to pay Dixon $10,000 plus statutory 
interest thereon and finding Bad Boys in contempt of court for failing to abide by the 
district court's August 25, 2008 Order, this Judgment was filed by the district court on 
December 29, 2008. [R. at 287-289.] 
On December 24, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. at 285-286.] 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW, 
1. All of the preceding paragraphs with citations to the Record constitute facts 
of the case. 
2. The district court found that "Bad Boys was or should have been aware that 
this is a civil lawsuit dealing with unlawful detainer and not a criminal action, which is 
apparently the typical forum where Bad Boys issues bonds." [R. at 231.] 
3. Continuing, the district court noted, "Regardless of the alleged 
representations from court personnel, Bad Boys is in the business of issuing bonds and, 
again, should have been aware that a possession bond is very different from a bail bond." 
[R. at 231.] 
4. In denying Bad Boys' Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the district court 
determined that Bad Boys was not without a remedy because it could pursue one against 
the Jeffersons. [R. at 231.] 
5. In addressing Bad Boys' Motion to Reconsider, the district court found 
"that Bad Boys was uniquely qualified to discern the difference between various types of 
bonds." [R. at 275-276.] 
6. Continuing, the district court stated, "Clearly, Bad Boys understood that it 
was posting a bond in the context of a civil case and not a criminal case." [R. at 276.] 
7. Concluding, the district court said, "[Bad Boys'] failure to seek counsel and 
its purported reliance on court personnel does not relieve Bad Boys of its obligations 
under the bond." [R. at 276.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Bad Boys was uniquely qualified to discern the difference between a bail 
bond used in a criminal setting and a cash or possession bond used in the unlawful 
detainer setting. Given this unique qualification, it was unreasonable for Bad Boys to 
rely on purported misrepresentations by court personnel regarding the appropriate type of 
bond for this unlawful detainer proceeding. The Court should affirm the decision of the 
district court finding that Bad Boys is not excused from its obligation to pay Dixon the 
bond amount because of Bad Boys' purported reliance on court personnel, as any such 
reliance was not reasonable given Bad Boys' unique status. 
2. The Court should affirm the decision of the district court and not allow Bad 
Boys to change this proceeding from an unlawful detainer proceeding into a criminal bail 
bond proceeding. While Bad Boys was compensated for posting the bond, it now argues 
it should not have to pay out on the bond because the bond it posted was the wrong type 
of bond. However, as the district court found, Bad Boys was uniquely positioned to 
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discern the difference between various types of bonds. Therefore, Bad Boys should not 
be allowed to place the blame for its neglect on any other person, and likewise should not 
be allowed to have the rules of its mistakenly filed bond govern this proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT BAD BOYS 
WAS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO DISCERN THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES OF BONDS AND THAT ITS 
PURPORTED RELIANCE ON COURT PERSONNEL DOES NOT 
EXCUSE IT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BOND. 
On two separate occasions, the district court correctly found that Bad Boys was 
uniquely qualified to discern the difference between various types of bonds. Because of 
Bad Boys' unique qualifications in the bond industry and its daily business of issuing 
bonds, Bad Boys' alleged reliance on court personnel regarding the type of bond to be 
posted in the underlying unlawful detainer proceeding does not excuse it of its 
obligations under the bond at issue in this matter. Moreover, given Bad Boys' business 
of issuing bonds and unique qualifications in the bond industry, it cannot now avoid its 
obligation to Dixon by arguing the bond it posted was an improper bond for an unlawful 
detainer action. Therefore, the Court should affirm the district court's ruling. 
A. BAD BOYS' PURPORTED RELIANCE O N COURT PERSONNEL DOES NOT EXCUSE 
ITS OBLIGATION T O PAY DIXON THE BOND AMOUNT, 
After hearing arguments from landlord-plaintiff Dixon and tenant-defendants 
Jeffersons at the immediate occupancy hearing in the underlying unlawful detainer action 
on the afternoon of June 9, 2008, the Honorable Judge Dever for the district court issued 
a ruling from the bench ordering the Jeffersons to either (a) execute and file a possession 
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bond in the amount of $10,000.00 in the form of a cash bond or property bond within 72 
hours, or (b) vacate the premises at issue in the lawsuit within 72 hours. An order 
containing the terms of the district court's ruling was signed and filed by the district court 
two days later, on June 11, 2008 (the "June 11th Order") [R. at 88-89.] 
With regard to the bond alternative, the June 11 Order specifically states the 
Defendants were required to 
[E]xecute and file a possession bond in the amount of $10,000.00, in the 
form of a cash bond or property bond, payable to the clerk of court for the 
benefit of Plaintiff Dixon Building, L.L.C., for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against you in this action . . . . 
J.L. 
[Emphasis added]. This June 11 Order was clear on its face. The bond required was a 
possession bond - the precise type of bond used in the unlawful detainer setting and 
contemplated by the unlawful detainer statutes. See Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-808 
(2008). 
As noted in both the June 11th Order and in the unlawful detainer statute, the 
purpose of this possession bond was to insure Dixon that it could collect the probable 
amount of the costs of the lawsuit and damages in the event it was ultimately determined 
that the Jeffersons had improperly withheld possession of the premises. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-808(4)(b)(vi). Dixon relied on the district court's June 11th Order in good 
faith, knowing the very reason the district court ordered the Jeffersons to post a 
possession bond was to protect Dixon against any damages ultimately adjudged against 
the Jeffersons based on their unlawful detainer of the premises. 
Ultimately, after an evidentiary hearing on the unlawful detainer matter before the 
Honorable Judge Faust, the district court did indeed determine the Jeffersons had been 
unlawfully detaining the premises, and ordered the Jeffersons to pay Dixon damages and 
costs in the amount of $19,343.53. The district court likewise issued an Order For 
Payment of Possession Bond wherein it mandated that "Bad Boys Bail Bonds shall forfeit 
to Craig Mecham of Dixon Building, L.L.C. the sum of $10,000.00, to be paid from the 
Possession Bond filed with the Court by Adrian Jefferson and Rosae L. Jefferson on or 
about June 11, 2008." [R. at 190-191.] 
Bad Boys refused to comply with the district Court's Order for Payment of the 
Possession Bond. Bad Boys' argument then and now is that it should not have to pay the 
bond amount because it detrimentally relied on representations of court employees in 
posting the bond. 
The question of reliance is a factual question for the trier of fact to decide. 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980); see also Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). 
When challenging a trial court's findings, an appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. . . . 
Due to the trial court's advantaged position, the presumptions favor its 
judgment. Where there is dispute and disagreement in the evidence, we 
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects and fairly drew the 
inferences to be derived therefrom which gave his decision support.... 
Furthermore, we will uphold the trial court's findings unless we conclude 
that they are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes 
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. 
8 
Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App 69, \ 27, 180 P.3d 765 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
At the evidentiary hearing on November 19, 2008, the district court heard 
evidence from Bad Boys relating to Bad Boys' alleged reliance on court 
personnel, as well as its argument that it should be excused from performing under 
the bond based on the representations from court personnel. [R. at 274, 306.] 
However, after considering the evidence presented by Bad Boys in support of its 
position, the district court ruled against Bad Boys finding that "Its failure to seek 
counsel and its purported reliance on court personnel does not relieve Bad Boys of 
its obligation under the bond." [R. at 276.] 
The district court's findings in regard to Bad Boys' reliance were based on live 
testimony and are adequately supported by the record and must be given deference based 
on the district court's advantaged position as the trier of fact. Therefore, this Court 
should uphold the district court's determination that Bad Boys should not be relieved of 
its obligations under the bond as stated in its November 24, 2008 Memorandum Decision 
and Order. 
B. GIVEN BAD BOYS' UNIQUE QUALIFICATIONS T O DISCERN T H E DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES O F BONDS, BAD BOYS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
To AVOID PAYING DIXON THE JUDGMENT AMOUNT BECAUSE IT POSTED THE 
WRONG TYPE O F BOND. 
Although it profited by posting the bond, Bad Boys now argues that it should be 
forgiven of its obligations to perform under the bond and be released from paying the 
judgment amount to Dixon because the bond it posted was not the type of bond required 
9 
in an unlawful detainer proceeding. However, as the district court correctly found, Bad 
Boys was uniquely positioned to discern the difference between various types of bonds, 
and its failure to post the appropriate type of bond does not relieve it of its obligations 
under the bond. Bad Boys should not be allowed to place the blame and resulting 
consequences of its own errors and neglect on Dixon or the court personnel, as it sought 
to do in its Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion to Reconsider, and as it now again 
seeks to do in this appeal. 
Bad Boys spends a large portion of its brief discussing bail bonds and making 
arguments based on the law applicable to bail bonds. [See Brief of Appellant, at 18-23, 
34-37]. However, such analysis is inapposite in the case at bar. Bad Boys posted a bond 
in what it clearly knew was a civil unlawful detainer action. Bad Boys must not be 
allowed to hijack this case into a proceeding governed by criminal statutes applicable to 
bail bonds based on its choice to ignore the applicable unlawful detainer statutes in 
posting the bond. This Court should find that Bad Boys' application of the law of bail 
bonds is inapplicable in the case at bar, and affirm the district court's order.1 
1
 On appeal, Bad Boys also argues the district court erred by denying Bad Boys' motion 
for joinder. However, Bad Boys was fully heard in regard to this matter. In its August 
25, 2008 Order, the district court refused to join Bad Boys as a party defendant and found 
that Bad Boys had no standing to advance its motion, but nevertheless fully considered 
Bad Boys' Motion To Set Aside Judgment and rendered a judgment on the merits after 
considering Bad Boys' arguments. [R. at 230-231.] Moreover, the district court likewise 
considered all of the arguments Bad Boys raised in its Motion to Reconsider and held an 
evidentiary hearing - at which it allowed Bad Boys to present evidence - before entering 
its final decision. [R. at 274-276.] The orders impacting Bad Boys were the July 7, 
2008 Order for Payment of Possession Bond [R. at 190-191.] and November 24, 2008 
Memorandum Decision and Order [R. at 275] pertaining to the Order to Show cause. 
Neither of these orders required that Bad Boys be a party to the proceeding. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Dixon respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's November 24, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order. 
DATED this 5 ^ day of August, 2009. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Nickolas S.ftUce 
Attorneys for the Dixon Building, L.L.C. 
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C. Danny Frazier 
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